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The confession as a 'practice of freedom' : feminism, Foucault and 'elsewhere' 
truths 
Abstract 
When a man comes before his judges with nothing but his crimes, when he has nothing to say but "this is 
what I have done," when he has nothing to say about himself, when he does not do the tribunal the favor 
of confiding to them something like the secret of his own being, then the judicial machine ceases to 
function (Foucault, 1978:18). 
This paper places Foucault's discussion of the confession as an uncovering of the truth of the self 
alongside his ideas of an aesthetics of existence in what might be considered a 'limit' case: a case in 
which a woman, along with three other women, is accused of killing a man previously unknown to her. The 
intention here is to read two separate confessions as discourses of both subjection and subjectivity; of 
pathology and ethics; as uncovering the truth, and as reinventing the truth. My first reading considers the 
confession in its most ancient form: the coupling of confession and torture; the 'dark twins of history' 
(Foucault, 1976:59). I will consider the repositioning of this coupling of confession and torture as forensic 
practice in the geographical and historical present. My second reading concerns the confession as a 
reinvention of truth and self. Following a brief discussion of Foucauldian notions of resistance and ethics 
and their relevance for feminism, I would like to consider the potential for reading these confessions as a 
'practice of freedom' in and through the reinvention of the ethical self (Foucault, 1991:3-20). I am not 
looking for the Truth of these confessions. Rather, I am interested in their truth effects; their potential for 
creating various trtlths. 
This journal article is available in Law Text Culture: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol2/iss1/4 
THE CONFESSION AS A
IPRACTICE OF FREEDOM':
FEMINISM, FOUCAULT AND
IELSEWHERE' TRUTHS
Ros Mills
W hen a man comes before his judges withnothing but his crimes, when he has nothingto say but "this is what I have done," when
he bas nothing to say about himself, when he does not do
the tribunal the favor of confiding to them something like
the secret of his own being, then the judicial machine
ceases to function (Foucault, 1978:18).
This paper places Foucault's discussion of the confession as an
uncovering of the truth of the self alongside his ideas of an aesthetics of
existence in what might be considered a 'limit' case: a case in which a
woman, along with three other women, is accused of killing a man
previously unknown to her. The intention here is to read two separate
confessions as discourses of both subjection and subjectivity; of pathology
and ethics; as uncovering the truth, and as reinventing the truth. My tirst
reading considers the confession in its most ancient form: the coupling of
confession and torture; the 'dark twins of history' (Foucault, 1976:59). I will
consider the repositioning of this coupling of confession and torture as
forensic practice in the geographical and historical present. My second
reading concerns the confession as a reinvention of truth and self. Following
a brief discussion of Foucauldian notions of resistance and ethics and their
relevance for feminism, I would like to consider the potential for reading
these confessions as a 'practice of freedom' in and through the reinvention
of the ethical self (Foucault, 1991:3-20). I am not looking for the Truth of
these confessions. Rather, I am interested in their truth effects; their potential
for creating various trtlths.
It has been during my work on women who kilF that I have been struck
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by the way in which the confession is so obviously implicated in the
truthlknowledge/power nexus. Not simply as a question of the truth of the
matter; the who, the why, and the how of the crimes that I am looking at, but
rather the way in which the confession is implicated in the exercise oftruth
as an exercise of knowledge/power. In the cases I am considering the
confession is pivotal, not only to the outcomes of the trials, but to the way in
which women's subjectivity is constructed - by the experts Gudges,
lawyers, doctors) - and by the women themselves. I am interested then in
the confession as it is implicated in the fonnation of female subjectivities
through the voices of domination and the voices of resistance: the voice of
the expert who listens, judges, interprets, or extorts the confession, and the
voice of the one who confesses.
D OM I NAT 10 N / RES I STAN C E:
Most of Foucault's work on the confession is in The History ofSexuality
Volume One. Foucault notes that it is the invocation of expert knowledges of
'the subject', particularly the knowledges derived from religion and
psychoanalysis, which work through the body as particular forms, or
exercises, of power. Foucault refers to this power as biopower (Foucault,
1976: 140-1,143-4). It is a power which is exercised in the Twentieth century
through practices of self-surveillance to create 'docile bodies'. Foucault
argues that this surveillance occurs through popularised discourses of the
self; particularly discourses of sex as self. The need to confess the truth of
oneself (to priests, tQ family, to doctors, therapists and so forth) - this need,
or compulsion, to confess and the confession itself~ draws on the language
of domination and/or authority as the language of freedom.
I have been interested for some time in pursuing Foucault's explanations
of power as domination/resistance. Foucault argues that "Where there is
power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is
never in a position of exteriority in relation to power" (Foucault, 1976:95).
Foucault's concept of power as working through bodies, as always relational,
always shifting, as a process, exercise and effect, is a useful one I think. In
his work on the confession, however, it is interesting, and perhaps
significant, that he tends to emphasise historical moments of domination at
the expense of moments of resistance. One reason that could be given for this
emphasis on domination is that it is easier to talk about, or practise,
resistance if we understand the workings of oppression. In this case then, we
could say, that it is fust necessary to understmld the way in which authorial
voices and expert knowledges create truths, before we can resist these truths
or posit other truths. This way of thinking about resistance, however, seems
somewhat contentious since it suggests all resistance as consciously and
rationally considered. It also suggests that all forms of resistance are
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'progressive', or positive. Yet, while for Foucault power relations "are both
intentional and nonsubjective ... imbued through and through with
calculation" these power relations have their own logic, aims and objectives
(Foucault, 1976:95). Thus, he argues, "it is often the case that no one is there
to have invented them and few who can be said to have formulated them"
(Foucault, 1976:95).
It seems however that Foucault fails to take this logic of power into
account in terms of his own work, and it may be this failure, or the logic of
his own argument, that results in his tendency to privilege voices of
domination over voices of resistance. This tendency has been noted by
several feminists. Frances Bartkowski, for instance, points out that;
in Foucault's text(s) the words of those who confess are
more camouflaged than the covert operations of power that
proceed from the satisfied will to know that extorts the
confession (Bartkowski, 1988:47).
Bartkowski's explanation for this is Foucault's own position of
enunciation: his own will to powerlknowledge/pleasure and resistance
"which may know itself as such but gives no voice to its other half'
(Bartkowski:45). Thus, while
The confession of which Foucault speaks at length is an
attempt to give voice to the resistance: .. . what we
(readers/confessors) hear are not the voices of women,
children, homosexuals, perverts, but the voice of power as
it institutionalizes, rationalizes, domesticates, and
suppresses those very discourses by which it shores itself
up (Bartkowski, 1988:45),
Importantly, since there is no 'outside' to history, discourses used to
construct truths and subjectivities are drawn from the authoriall'11owledges
of the time - for instance, medical, religious and legal knowledges. Yet, there
are potentials for creating spaces for plays of power 'within' history; subtle
plays of power which can work to 'shore up' truths, but may also work to
shift meanings and truths. In this paper I will draw attention to particular
instances of confession in which absence and silence are implicated in the
exercise of both resistance and domination. But while silence and absence
can be a powerful 'last resort' for those denied an apparent voice in liberal-
legal language, I hope to show how, in this instance at least, resistance also
finds a potential voice in and through the language of domination.
Something to consider at this point then are the implications of
Foucault's arguments that domination and resistance are entwined, that they
are part of the powerlknowledge/pleasure nexus; that they are caught up in
the same workings, or exercises, of power. In such a scenario it is pertinent
to ask how resistance and domination might be lmderstood as different parts
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of the same power nexus? How resistance and domination might be
understood in relation to notions of intentional, conscious, unconscious,
spontaneous, individual and concerted activity? And lastly, we need to ask
how the female body is implicated in this power nexus. For it may be that
Foucault's own pleasure in male bodies and man to man relationships
implicates him in a logos of power which explains (at least partly) his elision
of the female body. It is in this context also that we could read Foucault ali
male body implicated in a will to powerlknowledge/pleasure which accounts
for his movement from a focus on 17th-20th Europe to a focus on classical
Greek history: a period which valorises the male body and male to male
relationships.
While in his earlier work, Foucault speaks mainly of power in terms of
oppression/domination, in his later work he explains the 'logos' of power as
related to hotb liberation and ethics - as in fact free and ethical in the sense
of having knowledge: about one's self (as body/ power) and how to conduct
this self as citizen (Foucault, 1991,1984). What I would like to take from this
later work is the idea of the invention of the ethical self in connection with
others. I would like to consider the implications or possibilities of placing a
reinvention of a female self/subject alongside the construction of the
pathological female self, a construct tied to notions of domination and the
'docile body' (Foucault, 1979: 138». Arguably, the historical relationship of
the female body to knowledge and to self complicates a feminist embrace of
Foucault's later work on ethics and selfuood (Gatens, 1991; Pateman, 1989,
1988; Lloyd, 1984;1986). Despite, yet also because of, such complications
Foucault's notion of an a~stbetics of existence is offered here as a way of
refocllssing women's resistance as a will to power. The terminology of
resistance which can be invoked in the context of this paper includes the
potentially useful phrase 'practices of freedom'. It is in the context of
Foucault's work on an aesthetics of existence that I will posit the confession
as a practice of freedom, in the sense of reinventing a female self/subject in
connection with others.
FEMINISM AND AN AESTHETICS OF
EXISTENCE
According to Foucault (1991: 6) the Greek notion of Ethos, as
"deportment and the way to behave ... the subject's mode of being and ...
manner of acting", implies ... a relation with others to the extent that care for
self renders one competent to occupy a place in the city, in the community
or in interindividual relationships which are proper -whether it be to exercise
a magistracy or to have friendly relationships (Foucault, 1991:7).
What was important for the Greeks, Foucault says, was not to be a slave;
a slave cannot be ethical, or practise Ethos, because a slave is not free. the
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Greek Ethos was, heargues, "the concrete expression of liberty" (1991:6).
Foucault's notions of an aesthetics of existence owe a lot to Nietzsche.
According to Nietzsche the 'slave' is one who is filled with resennnent
(ressentiment), who reacts rather than acts, who says "I", rather than does "I"
(Nietzsche in Grosz, 1994:127). Nietzsche argues that ressentiment is the
product of memory, or the refusal to forget. Memory, as corporeal
knowledge, works through the body to give meaning to the tenns T 'reality',
'truth', 'history'. It is memory which enables contracts to be formed,
promises to be made. Thus, memory enables social organisations and
systems of law. In order for social organisation and law to function then
forgetfulness must be renounced, or be made to be renounced (Grosz,
1994:131). According to Nietzsche, pain is the key to instilling memory:
One can well believe that the answers and methods for
solving this primeval problem (the problem of how to instil
a memory in the subject) were not precisely gentle; perhaps
indeed there was nothing more fearful and uncanny in the
whole prehistory of man than his mnemotechnics ...
something of the terror that formerly attended all promises,
pledges and vows on earth is still effective ... Man could
never do without blood, torture and sacrifice when he felt
the need to create a memory for himself ... (Nietzsche
quoted in Grosz, 1994:131).
The claim that there are primordial and "still effective" relationships
pertaining between ressentiment, memory and pain, are important for this
paper and I will return to them in a moment. The important point here is the
Foucauldian borrowing of the notion of self as not slave. Perhaps it is also
well to note at this point that Nietzschean notions of 'not slave' rely heavily
upon notions of ressentiment and the privileging of virility (Grosz,
1994:129). Clearly such notions have implications for women.
The necessity for women to achieve ethical selfhood through rejection of
(sexual, economic, political and social) slavery has been articulated by
women in various contexts. However, the barriers to citizen/self have not yet
been fOlly overcome. Nor are these barriers acknowledged by Foucault.
Nevertheless, such barriers continue to be a site of women's historically and
culturally situated resistances, and as such suggest a place in which the logos
of power as domination/resistance, being!becoming, and freedom/ethics
might flourish
What I want to take from Foucault is the way in which his notion of
ethics is associated with this process of 'becoming'; with resistance, with
action, with the self, and with personal relationships. Thus, rather than a code
of morals that are either imposed or fixed, such ethics allow for a
consideration of context and, importantly, are formed in terms of connections
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with self and others. It seems to me that some form of these ethics might be
useful for feminisms which place a priority on freedom as the practice of
connecting with other women - connections which are either devalued or
absent in patriarchal moral codes. A personal ethics which values female
self-knowledge (invoking, perhaps, some form of the Foucauldian sense of
self-knowledge as body! power! effect! action) while placing a priority on
connections between women, has the potential to disrupt the normalisation
of fixed, hetero and hierarchicised sexual differences.
The way I would like to consider the notion of an aesthetics of existence
as an ethical reinvention of the female self is, firstly, by recognising the
problem for many women of relating to a code of morality which is shot
through with notions of guilt and is bereft of an ethics of care of the self in
connection with others. Of particular concern here is women's peculiar
relationship to the paradoxical christian notion of self abnegation as a way of
experiencing seltbood. It is as though christianity flirts with a feminised
ethos quite at variance with the masculine Greek ethos of heroic self which
Foucault so admires. So, where does this leave women, seltbood and ethics?
If feminists want to reject, at the very least, the self-abnegation of christian
morality and embrace a code of ethics more in tune with the heroic. can we,
following Foucault, afford to embrace a form of morality which valorises
Greek ethics of the self?: ...
The task for feminism, as a political philosophy and as a practice of
freedom, is to extricate the 'feminine' from the closures of victim and
authorial languages of oppression - without valorising the 'masculine', or,
and this may be a related problem, falling into a relativity which surely can
only end up depoliticising actions, practices, and readings. That is, we are
always implicated in the languages of domination when negotiating a
language of freedom. It seems to me that many of the theoretical tools of
marxist, radical and liberal feminisms, psychoanalysis and posttnodernism
lead us further into this problematic rather than away from it. I want, for
instance, to consider spontaneous re/actions which are not consciously
considered, without the related notions of 'false consciousness' or fantasy in
subconscious sexual repression. I want to maintain the materiality of
'woman' or 'female subject' without the essence of woman. I want to attempt
to read power as it is scripted by female bodies. And, while recognising the
context of domination and resistance and their symbiotic relationship, I want
(in this instance anyway) to privilege voices of resistance.
I hope that there might be something to be gained from a feminist
appropriation and reworking of Foucault's notions of power as
exercise/effect, domination/resistance, when read alongside his ethics of the
self as an art1 or aesthetics of existence. The confession seems one useful
place to start: after all the confession, while implicated in both resistance and
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domination, necessarily demands a relationship to the self. It is the nature of
relationships to the self and others, and the connection of these relationships
to truth!knowledge/power and the female body which, I believe, may benefit
from feminist scrutiny.
In the following instances of the confession, I will refer directly to trial
transcripts and legal documents. The voices which will be heard are those of
the confessor and the authorial voices of the medico-legal practitioners who
interpret the confessions. Of course my own authorial voice as feminist
interpreter (with all the problems that this entails) works here to offer a
political reading of the two confessions.
SEXUAL/TEXTUAL VIOLENCE AND
J"ELSEWHERE TRUTHS': THE STORY
Here is a brief synopsis of the case which is the focus for this discussion:
In 1991 Tracey Wigginton stood in the Supreme Court
of Queensland accused of killing forty-seven year old
Edward Baldock in a suburban park during the early hours
of an October morning in 1989. A week later three other
women stood accused of being implicated in the same
crime. The middle-aged white male victim was thought to
have been chosen at random. The motive was unclear. It
was a killing for no apparent reason. The victim had been
discovered on the morning of the killing. He was unclothed
and had died from stab wounds to the neck and body. The
four accused women were in police custody by the end of
the day. Tracey Wigginton made a confession to the police
which absolved the other three women and claimed full
responsibility for the killing of Baldock. A Health Tribunal
was held for Wigginton at which she was found fit to stand
trial. At her trial Wigginton pleaded guilty and received the,
mandatory life sentence. The guilt of the other three women
rested on an alleged conspiracy between the women. The
defence based their cases on the separation of the three
women. More significantly the defence of each of the three
women relied on their separation from the absent Tracey
Wigginton.
Following Tracey Wigginton's arrest for the murder of Edward Baldock
in 1989, it was suggested that she might be unfit to stand trial. A subsequent
Health Tribunal for Tracey Wigginton focused on the claim made by doctors
retained by the defence that Wigginton suffered from Multiple Personality
Disorder (MPD), considered by some areas of the medical profession to be
an extreme form of dissociation. Dissociation is thought to occur as a result
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of trauma and the way the mind responds to that trauma; namely, a closing
off or forgetting of the traumatic events; in the case of MPD it is believed
that 'alters', other consciousnesses, or 'facet~' of the personality, step in and
take over in particular situations. An important consideration in MPD is the
way in which the healthy self is understood as complete, or unified. The
unhealthy self then is the split, disrupted and fragmented, self. The problem
most referred to in discussion with sufferers of MPD is amnesia (loss of
memory) and the resulting fears related to being 'out of control' or not being
aware of who one is. That is, MPD, as the fragmentation of self, is directly
related to a lack of linear memory. While any fann of protracted pain/trauma
or 'near death experience' may be related to MPD the most common reason
given for its development, especially over the last ten or so years, is incest,
or child sexual abuse occurring over an extended period of time. Ritual
abuse, with its overtones of medieval religions, is often raised in relation to
Multiple Personality Disorder. MPD as a medical diagnosis is a strongly
contested area in the field of forensic medicine. One could argue that it
represents "less a field of knowledge to be conquered than a modality of
power to be secured and justified" (Foucault, 1978:6).2
The use of hypnosis was an important consideration in the Health
Tribunal for Tracey Wigginton. Hypnosis is sometimes used as a diagnostic
tool in MPD. Medical debates on the diagnostic use of hypnosis include the
possibility that, since hypnosis is itself a form of dissociation, it may
exacerbate or even cause MPD to occur in the hypnotised patient. Debates
concerning hypnosis also consider the problems of transference and the
desire of the patient to please the doctor; that is, the danger that the hypnotist
may lead, or shape, the patient who may be eager to 'comply with' or
'please' the hypnotist. It was this latter argument that was tlle focus of
medico-legal debates in the Tribunal for Wigginton. The reason given to the
Tribunal for applying hypnosis in Wigginton's case was that it would speed
up the process of ascertaining whether or not Wigginton was suffering from
MPD. Wigginton at :fIrst refused hypnosis. She subsequently agreed to it
after being told it would help her headaches and act as an aid to relaxation
(Queensland Health Tribunal, 1990:108).
While further discussion of MPD in the context of Wigginton's Health
Tribunal could be fruitful in this discussion of corporeality and resistance, a
few contextual (and I'm afraid rather dense) points must suffice here as a
'way in' to this particular reading of the Health Tribunal: One, Tracey
Wigginton's hypnotic sessions are presented to the Tribunal on a video
screen, hence Wigginton's hyper-real body is present on the screen d~spite
her 'real' absence; two, in the medico-legal contest for the validity of MPD
as a medical phenomenon Wigginton 'stands in' for theory, that is, the absent
Wigginton can be said to represent MPD itself in the power struggle between
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theorists;3 three, memory assumes a central place in discussions of tbe
'healthy self'; four, throughout the Tribunal there is a discursive
fragmentation of female subjectivity occuning alongside (and intenneshing
with) discourses of essential femininity and masculinity; five. a covert
discursive relationship is discernible between 'modem' scientific discourses
of madness and 'medieval' discourses of demonic possession; and lastly,
during hypnosis (administered by the doctors retained by the defence)
Tracey Wigginton makes a 'second confession' . It is this confession that
I would like to posit as one which has its links with modem notions of
sexual/textual harassment, ancient and medieval couplings of confession and
torture, and with notions of truth as residing 'elsewhere'.
SEXUAL/TEXTUAL VIOLENCE AND
'ELSEWHERE TRUTHS': THE EVIDENCE
The following evidence is given in response to a question concerning the
doctor hugging Wigginton and touching her on the knee.
While sexual harassment was hinted at these suggestions were quickly
diverted into evidence concerning the appropriateness of using hypnosis in
the case of MPD.
I think the notion of torture in the sense of a violence done to the body in
order to uncover an elsewhere truth can be invoked here:
Dr. Clarke: the background to that (the touching) was
my extreme concern that in the interest - the interest of
challenging her to the utmost in the chance that other facets
('personalities') would emerge, I was also doing something
which, because I am a clinical psychologist, which I simply
would not do without preparation and support and
reassurance. I felt, as I said to Dr Quinn afterwards, I am
going to quit this case. On the second or third occasion, I
forget which, I walked out in the hall and I wouldn't speak
to Jeff there or Dr Quinn. because I was appalled at the
, distress that I had caused her. I realised intellectually what
, I had to do but I was shaken by it and at that point I said I
am quitting right now (Queensland Mental Health Tribunal,
1990:108).
He continues;
I bad pushed her very extensively without relief,
without reassurance, to go though the episodes of the
murder. She was shrieking out '1 can't stop'. She was
sweating. She was contorting herself. I found this, as a
clinician, inexcusable to put somebody through the rigours
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of traumatic exposure without any buffeting or support in
the risk of doing permanent psychological damage. That I
admit is a controversial question but I certainly do believe
it's a possibility and when I left I felt drained and worn out
and I felt I never wished to do this again (Queensland
Mental Health Tribunal. 1990:108).
Referring to the system of punishment in the eighteenth century Foucault
claims that:
If torture was so strongly embedded in legal practice, it
was because it revealed truth and showed the operation of
power. It assured the articulation of the written on the oral,
the secret on the public, the procedure of investigation on
the operation of the confession; it made it possible to
reproduce the crime on the visible body of the criminal; the
same horror had to be manifested and annulled. It also
made the body of the condemned man the place where the
vengeance of the sovereign was applied, the anchoring
point for a manifestation of power (Foucault. 1977:55).
In the twentieth century the focus of punishment has, in Foucault's
schema, shifted from the body to the soul (or mind) and from the retributive
law of the sovereign to the surveillance of the expert. Arguably, such a
historical shift does not work to negate, but rather to restate, the notion of
torture invoked here.
Now I will refer to one of the narratives concerning what happened on
the night of the killIng as told by McMillan QC public defender for the
applicant in his address to the Tribunal. McMillan is here discussing what
appears to be a gap in Wigginton's memory ... he relates this to a process of
'switching alters' ... he then goes on to use the medical evidence to speculate
as to which of Wigginton'~ alters were present at the killing. Firstly,
however. it may be worth recalling Nietzsche's claim that:
The worse man's memory has been, the more fearful has
been the appearance of his customs; the severity of the
penal code provides an especially significant measure of the
degree of effort needed to overcome forgetfulness and to
impose a few primitive demands of social existence as
present realities upon the slaves of momentary affect and
desire (Nietzsche in Grosz, 1994:132)
and
... if pain hurts more today, it simply requires a certain
sublimation and subtilization, that is to say, it has to appear
translated into the imaginative and psychical and adorned
with such innocent names that even the tenderest and most
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hypocritical conscience is not suspicious of them
(Nietzsche in Grosz; 134)
McMilIan:Friday night is interesting because it puzzled
Dr Quinn that she could remember so much of what had
transpired, but there was a gap from the time the car got into
Main Street until it got to the park and his impression is that
she switched again in that period of time .,. and when one
looks at the deepening voice - there's a nan-ative as it were
about what happened, and then - 'I want him'. Then,
under hypnosis we hear that 'Big Tracey' was present. 'The
Observer' would appear to have been present because she
could very detachedly speak about what was happening.
Little Tracey was present, and as Dr Quinn found out
towards the end of his sessions Avril was present. Bobby
was certainly present and we know Bobby now to be not
one alter alone but perhaps an alter as a front, and the
statement 'Bobby put the knife in', we don't lmow whether
that can be accepted at face value or not, or whether it was
something else, the alter behind the alter as it were
(Queensland Health Tnbunal, 1990:462).
The doctors for Wigginton claim that Wigginton (as unhealthy
dissociatedJ fragmented subject) was deluded into believing that she was in
fact killing George Wigginton, her grandfather and defacto father, rather than
the unknown man, Edward Baldock (there were hints here of child sexual
abuse). Not surprisingly, Wigginton's alters mirror social roles and popular
narratives of the feminine and the masculine: the child victim 'Little Tracey' .
Tracey's avenger and protector, the masculine 'Bobby'. And 'Avril', the evil
stepmother/grandmother. It is of course the masculine self which commit,;
the violence, although this alter is under the power of Avril the power behind
the throne 'as it were'; 'the alter behind the alter' (QueenSland Health
Tribunal, 1990:462).
Interestingly then the killing is presented in this narrative in terms of a
Freudian-like scenario of revenge, retribution, and anger against a father
figure. 4 This is quite at variance with the other narrative; the one of the
'unreasonable' murder of a total stranger. This confession as it is wrung from
Wigginton and is interpreted by her doctors provides Wigginton with a
reason for the killing (which is also a motive). But at the very moment that
the reason/motive is offered, so it is pathologised. The discourses of MPD
used by the defence work to construct Wigginton as the ultimate victim, the
victim of her own violence as well as tbe victim of the violence of others.
So, how is it possible to consider this confession as a particular form of
truthlknowledge? In their unpublished paper, The Production afTruth: Body
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and Soul, Meure and Albury discuss the way in which the ancient coupling
of torture with confession suggests that the truth has to be violently
uncovered. In such a scenario, the suggestion is that the truth is not
immediately accessible, but rather, lies elsewhere. This 'elsewhere truth' has
its roots in Greek notions of an insubstantial and chaotic truth which was
considered to reside in women and slaves, but which required· the
philosopher, as interpreter and as judge, to give it substance, or fann. Hence
Greek notions of Truth as dependent upon mind over body, order over chaos,
moderation over excess. It is important to note that, as well as passivity, both
chaos and excess (of passion for instance) were abhorred and feminised in
Greek culture. The ideas of Rousseau (among others) and later of Freud take
up the idea that women are either passive or excessively passionate; unable
to show moderacy in their interpersonal relationships; thus, they argue,
women are unable to be 'balanced', or 'just'. Modernity restates realion,
balance, moderation andjustice as masculine. In this scenario, female speech
mirrors female excess, being mere 'chatter' that must be interpreted,
reorganised, or silenced (Meure and Albury, 1994). In the case of Tracey
Wigginton, the way in which truth is uncovered under hypnosis might be
considered in the light of such discussions of truth and knowledge.
Perhaps I can move into a different textual space here and refer to the
work of feminist film theorist Mary Anne Doane (it is interesting at this point
to bear in mind the Tribunal video representation of Tracey Wigginton).
Doane (1987:53) notes that in women's medical films of the 'forties, a'l
in psychoanalytic practice, two types of narrative operate in opposition to
each other. This opposition, she suggests, appears to be between a disease
producing narrative (fantasy) and a therapeutic narrative (the truth). The two
narratives are thus "fantasy and imagination unleashed and story as history".
The first story (fantasy and imagination unleashed) suggests a lack of
boundaries, structure, logic and rationality. The second story (history)
suggests a structured, linear and rational story. Yet, and I think this is very
interesting, Doane suggests that it is not the truth of the woman's narrative
that is at stake here, since, as she says, for Freud "the necessity for historical
truth in fantasy was never established". Rather, the oppositions between the
two narratives rest on absence and presence, irrationality and rationality; the
dualisms of liberal/medico-legal language. What is necessary in order to
make the woman's story into a healthy, balanced, linear, or understandable,
narrative is the presence of an interpreter. In this instance a doctor.
I would like to return to Nietzsche's theory of the mnemonics of pain
here. Clearly, the doctors arguing the case for MPD in the Tribunal for
Tracey Wigginton considered memory as the key to understanding 'self' or
subjectivity. So important is this concept that considerable pain is considered
'necessary'in order to establish memory and hence the truth of the person
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(rather than the truth of the event). Nietzsche's mnemonics of pain rests on
the idea that historically pain has been an enforcer of memory. This idea can
be substantiated here in the sense of perceiving the necessity to create a
memory, even if this memory is not 'the truth of the matter'. [As Foucault
has observed, a modem court is reluctant to punish a person it does not
'know' (Foucault, 1978).] In his discussion of memory, Nietzsche, or so it
seems, was problematising the notion of memory as both truth and self,
notions which postnlodemists likewise problematise. However, the related
notion that pain necessarily instils a memory (whether true or not), in the
sense of instilling a memory of an event, is less than convincing when
considering those experiences of pain which may seem to enforce
forgetfulness, rather than to 'overcome forgetfulness'. That is, it is possible
to remember pain, but forget the events surrounding the pain; or to (initially)
forget the pain itself, only to remember it sometime later. Could Nietzsche's
apparent neglect of the indeterminate relationships perraining between pain
and memory be due to the fact that historically the experiences of pain and
'forgetfulness' have tended to be the experiences of female bodies?
CONFESSION AS A PRACTICE OF FREEDOM
Now after this somewhat depressing discussion of the confession in and
through the authorial voice, I want to make a space for Tracey Wigginton's
resistance/ethical subjectivity. I want to see if - at the extremes or limits of
discourse (which includes its absences and silences), at the extremes or
limits of 'woman as victim versus woman as predator', of woman as the
unconscious bearer but not the articulator of truth - there is a place within
liberal/legal 'language' for an ethical female self. The way in which I want
to bring attention to this space of resistance/subjectivity is through
considering the play of power in and around Wigginton's absences and
silences. For amidst the clamour of sensationalist discourses which emanated
from the courtrooms throughout the various trials of the women accused of
complicity in the killing of Baldock, there was a centre of silence and
absence. Tbis silence and absence was not passive. Rather, it engendered
both surveillance and resistance. The locus of absence and silence can be
traced to Wigginton's confession and plea and the subsequent order in which
the trials of the four women occurred. I hope, therefore, that by placing
Wigginton's confessions in the context of Foucauldian ideas of
resistance/domination and an aesthetics of existence, it might be possible to
read these silences and absences (along with and as part of corporeal
inscription) as a 'practice of freedom': a logos / locus of female power which
works to subvert the storm of authorial medico-legal voices, rather than be
contained by them.
Tracey Wigginton was the frrst of the women to be interviewed by the
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police. The most incriminating evidence the police possessed was a bankcard
belonging to Wigginton. It was this evidence which led them to Wigginton
only hours after the murder. During the day following the murder, Wigginton
made statements to the police which denied her implication in the killing of
Baldock. She claimed the bankcard to be one she had lost in the park the
previous night while playing on some swings with a couple of friends. On
being officially informed toward the end of the day that these friends along
with her lover Lisa Ptaschinski had spoken to the police of their implication
in, or knowledge of, the murder ofEdward Baldock Tracey Wigginton asked,
'Is it true, have they gone to the police?' She then said; 'Put the tape back on,
I'll tell you what happened' (R v Ptaschinski, Jervis and Waugh, 1991:day
three). Tracey Wigginton proceeded to give a detailed confession as to how
she effected the murder. In her confession she took full responsibility for the
killing.
Wigginton says mat she acted alone. In this sense she has been complicit
in the depoliticisation of her act (that is, as the collective act of an oppressed
group against an oppressor). During the subsequent Health Tribunal.
Wigginton is complicit in the representation of her body as a pathology. She
even signals this pathology by her absence. Yet, there are clues which could
suggest that Tracey Wigginton treats her 'necessary' absence and silence
within this scenario as her own uncanny reversal, and, perhaps, as a
reinvention of her ethical self. These clues, I suggest, are Wigginton's
confessions and her plea of 'guilty' to murder. Arguably, through a
compliance with the authorial voices of the law, Wigginton's first confession
is an acceptance of responsibility for the killing. It is, however, a story of
what she did, rather than a 'life story'. In this way Wigginton's confession
refuses pathologisationlslavery. Wigginton's determination to plead 'guilty'
to murder, against the wishes of her forensic doctors, can likewise be read as
a refusal to remain in the position of 'unhealthy body', or in the position of
the oppressed. In this reading Wigginton is 'not slave'. She has said 'I did it.
I did it alone'. This is enough. The rest is silence.
r would like to read Wigginton's absence at her own Tribunal as her will
to power and to female integrity. I would like to read her plea to murder -
which makes possible her silence and her absence - as a will to self
knowledge: as heroic gesture. This is not of course to suggest that this is the
only, or the 'real', truth of the matter. Perhaps, following Foucault, I can
suggest that the truth of the matter is less an issue here than the effects of the
discourses which create the many truths of Tracey Wigginton. In this
particular reading Wigginton's confession and her plea to murder can be read
as a bid for freedom; the freedom of her co-accused and for her self. A way,
perhaps, through silence and absence, for Tracey Wigginton to realise
freedom through ethical connection with other women.
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Here then is a (limit) case offered in order to make possible, or
imaginable, the consideration of a female ethics of resistance which is not
dependent upon imposed codes of morality, on concepts of an essential
femininity, on a masquerade of masculinity, or on a rationality which renders
'woman' as the object of knowledge. Of course this reading of the
confessions is fraught with problems, especially if 'truth' is in question. For
instance, the christian concept of sacrifice, as a denial of the body - which
for women particularly has become a self-abnegation devoid of an ethics of
care for the self - may also have played a part here, complicating such a
reading of the confession. Nevertheless, perhaps the most important question
posed in this paper is: can an ethical female self maintain enough materiality
to escape fragmentation yet refuse immanence? Because, if it is the case, as
many feminists have argued, that medico-legal knowledge/truth is
thoroughly and deeply masculine, then the problem for feminists is how to
engage with such truth/knowledge without either forcing real women's
silences and abse~ces, or representing them (us) as victims or the 'monstrous
feminine'. How in such a scenario of truth/knowledge/power is women's
resistance to be heard?
CORPOREAL INSCRIPTIONS
It is here I think that a feminist focus on 'corporeal inscriptions' (Grosz,
1994) and on reading/writing the body (Jacobus, 1986) are helpful: a way
perhaps of (re)inserting the female body into what has thus far been
'masculine' theory. Consider hysteria. for instance. It is perhaps
symptomatic of Foucault's focus on oppression at the expense of resistance
that, despite his recognition of the centrality of Freud's categorisation of the
'female hysteric', he, along with Freud, fails to note women's use of hysteria
as corporeal resistance ... as a way of writing/ rewriting, inventing and
reinventing, female subjectivity.
I really-like the following quote from Mary Jacobus. It seems to fit well
with my readings of the trials, tribulations and resistances of Tracey
Wigginton. Jacobus (1986:109) says,
If the woman in the text is 'there', she is also 'not there',
certainly not its object, not necessarily even its author.
This, she suggests,
may be why the heroine of feminist critical theory is
not the silenced Irma, victim of Freudian theory, but the
hysterical Dora whose body is her text and whose refusal
to be the object of Freudian discourse makes her the
subject of her own (Jacobus, 1986: 109).
Such a bodily textual strategy seems pertinent to this reading of
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Wigginton's confessions. When considered alongside notions of power
working through bodies, this strategy allows a consideration of how there
might be a positive feminist reinvention of Tracey Wigginton. That is, how
it might be possible to represent Wigginton's subjectivity, her will to power,
in the context of her lived and situated bodily experiences/practices. A
reading of Wigginton's absences and silences allow us to ask: 'If she is not
there, how is she also there? If she is not the object of the text, is she then its
author? Is her 'performance', or her 'script', a hyperbolic mimk,'ry of the
symbolic forms of womanhood? Or, perhaps, manhood? Is her (conscious, or
unconscious) masquerade merely a parody of 'truth'; or is her hysterical
body an excess of representation which renders such truth formless?
Something which has become apparent to me while reading the
courtroom texts is that the extent of Wigginton's power appears to be in an
inverse relationship to her courtroom 'representability'. But if the truth of
Tracey Wigginton is not to be found on the fetishised surface of her
(videoed) body, then does it lie 'elsewhere'? And how might this
'elsewhere' transcend the depoliticising voices of legal and medical authority
while remaining 'embodied'?
During the Tribunal a medical narrative must be told in order to render
Wigginton's absent body as 'representable' on the video screen, or as
understandable in liberal/legal terms. Yet, in the telling of the courtroom
narrative, Tracey Wigginton's 'hysterical discourse' tells a story which can
be understood, or written, differently:
The violence ofthe doctors as this violence is written on her body;
The activities ofthe doctors as a horror story offorensic medicine;
The doctors as phallocentric symbols of Tracey Wigginton's
sexuaVtextual harassment,
Such a bodily script invites attention to the context of violence through
which Tracey Wigginton moves, and within which she is implicated, It
makes visible the violence working through the bodies of those in the
courtroom, and beyond. Violence, it seems, like power, creates truths,
realities, and subjectivities.
I would like to think that this paper is an engagement in the ongoing
feminist struggles between action and reaction, oppression and resistance.
'Freedom' has shown itself to be an ephemeral ideal, eclipsed as it has been
by concerns with the history of oppression. The important thing now may be
to pay less attention to being un/free, and more attention to becoming free,
to 'practising freedom'. This is not at all to negate histories of oppression,
nor the context of violence in which women continue to live. Nor is it to
suggest that we can all afford to stop working in the area of 'danger~.
Perhaps, ressentiment as a slave morality could only have been thought in
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this way by a member of the oppressor group. Nevertheless ressentiment
suggests a failure, or refusal, to overcome; a situation of stasis. Thus while
resentment (as well as recognition) of oppression has been imperative for
feminism, perhaps it is possible to both recognise and refuse oppression in
the one moment. Not an easy task. In considering the case of Tracey
Wigginton this might entail recognising the way in which power and
violence move through, and inscribe, bodies; not valorising or pathologising
Wigginton as always hero or always slave, but recognising her movements
between these positions; shifting the focus from the person of Wigginton to
her contextualised actions; and lastly separating (but not negating)
Wigginton's act of murder in the park from her acts of confession in the
courtroom.
The absence of Tracey Wigginton at the Health Tribunal and her silence
at her own trial led to her powerful symbolic presence both at the Tribunal
and in the subsequent trials of the other three women. Tracey Wigginton pre-
empted the possibility of her boqily presence at the Health Tribunal and
hence the telling of her story at her own trial. She agreed to an early date for
her trial and refused to plead not guilty to murder by reason of mental
abnonnality. Tracey Wigginton was, perhaps, less absented in court than
absent, less silenced in court than silent.
What I am attempting to argue here is that Wigginton's two confessions
and her 'guilty' plea - as her 'will' to silence, absence, and integrity - disrupt
medico-legal discourse, situate Wigginton, if only precariously,
inside/outside the dualisms of domination and resistance; essentialism and
performance; victim and perpetrator; slave and hero, and place her, if only
momentarily, in the position of not slave: an ethical female self in connection
with other women.
NOTES
IThis paper stems from a longer work I am doing on women who kill men with
whom they have no prior relationship. My research on these cases entails the readings
of transoripts of trials and, in the case of Tracey Wigginton, of the Health Tribunal.
My interest lies in considering the way in which the subjectivities of the women on
trial are constructed in the arena of the courtroom. I am also interested in various
concepts of violence, and what is at stake for women in these concepts.
21 suspect that in the present postmodem context the Multiple PersonaUty
syndrome may prove to be a 'threshold debate' within forensic discourse -rather as
'possession' and monomania have been in the past. The relationship between MPD
and incest also make it the site of struggle between feminism and forensic discourse.
particularly in light of discussions of 'false memory syndrome'.
3This idea owes much to Mary Jacobus' work on sexual/textual harrassment.
4'Gothic' narratives of ritual violence occur more overtly in the subsequent trials
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of the other three women accused of being implicated in the killing of Baldock. and
in the media reportage of the crime. It is in these arenas that Tracey Wigginton is
referred to as both witch and vampire.
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